Investment and Household Bargaining in Small-scale Farming Households - A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment from Rural Tanzania by Keenan, Michael et al.
 
   
 
 
Investment and Household 
Bargaining in Small-scale 
Farming Households: A Lab-
in-the-Field Experiment from 
Rural Tanzania 
Working Paper No. 359 
 
CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture 




Stanley Karanja Ng’ang’a  








Investment and Household 
Bargaining in Small-scale 
Farming Households 
 
A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment from Rural Tanzania 
 
Working Paper No. 359 
 
CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, 




Stanley Karanja Ng’ang’a  















Correct citation:  
Keenan, M., Pamuk, H, Ng’ang’a Karanja, S., Hella J. P. 2021. Investment and Household Bargaining 
in Small-scale Farming Households: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment from Rural Tanzania CCAFS 
Working Paper no. 359. Wageningen, the Netherlands: CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS).  
 
Titles in this series aim to disseminate interim climate change, agriculture and food security research 
and practices and stimulate feedback from the scientific community. 
 
The CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) is led by 
the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) and carried out with support from the 
CGIAR Trust Fund and through bilateral funding agreements. For more information, please visit 
https://ccafs.cgiar.org/donors.   
 
Contact: 
CCAFS Program Management Unit, Wageningen University & Research, Lumen building, 
Droevendaalsesteeg 3a, 6708 PB Wageningen, the Netherlands. Email: ccafs@cgiar.org 
 
 




© 2021 CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). 





This Working Paper (as applicable) is part of the work conducted under the CSA/SuPER - Upscaling 
CSA with small-scale food producers organised via VSLAs under the CCAFS program project and has 
not been peer reviewed.  The authors acknowledge both financial and technical support from 4th 
Global Challenges Programme (GCP 4) – a joint climate smart agriculture scaling program 
implemented in Eastern and Southern AFRICA with the support from the Netherlands Organization for 
Scientific Research (NWO) and the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and 
Food Security (CCAFS) for East Africa, which is carried out with support from the CGIAR Trust Fund 
and through bilateral funding agreements. For details please visit https://ccafs.cgiar.org/donors. The 
views expressed in this document cannot be taken to reflect the official opinions of these organizations. 
All images remain the sole property of their source and may not be used for any purpose without 





Agricultural investments often carry labor costs and market risks, and spouses negotiate and 
bargain to settle their conflicting preferences for risk and differing views on individual labor 
costs. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment with a real-effort task, we analyze man, woman, 
and joint decision-making in those investments. Our experiment randomizes the assignment 
of the investment decision-maker and laborer performing the real-effort task. This 
randomization allows us to obtain the effects of gender-related and joint decision-making on 
the amount of labor-intensive investments, allocation of those investments between risky and 
not risky alternatives within households, and outcomes of those decisions. Our findings show 
that men prefer to take production and market risks more often than women, investing higher 
amounts in risky investments. However, those investments' returns are low, as they cannot 
complete the task in which they have invested. When couples jointly decide, they choose 
investment amounts in line with man spouse preferences; however, allocate investments 
between risky and not risky investments in line with woman preferences. We also find that 
woman spouses who have participated in a gender-related training program take more risks 
and the joint investment decisions of the couple are closer to woman investment decisions 
when compared to other couples. Our results are in line with previous studies on the 
behavioral aspects of agricultural investments and can guide organizations in improving 
program design to increase agricultural technology and crop adoption. This paper contributes 
to the scarce literature on behavioral aspects influencing the gender gap in agricultural 
production and technology adoption. 
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The majority of the workforce in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is employed in the agricultural 
sector (International Labour Organization, 2021), and small-scale farming accounts for up to 
80% of agricultural production in SSA (IFAD, 2021). Despite the importance of small-scale 
farming, growth in small-scale productivity levels has remained stagnant in the past decades 
(Udry, 2010). While there are many factors determining farm production levels (environment, 
institutions, climate, technology, etc.), one important crosscutting issue is gender. Women 
account for about 40% of labor across SSA with considerable heterogeneity across countries. 
For example, in Tanzania women account for 52% of agricultural labor (Palacios-Lopez et al., 
2017). Yet, there are large productivity differences between men and women across SSA. 
Using ISA-LSMS data, UNDP (2015) finds that the conditional gender gap in productivity is 
around 30% in Uganda, Malawi, and Tanzania. 
 
The gender gap in agricultural productivity is impeding progress towards reaching the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Across Uganda, Malawi, and Tanzania, closing the 
gender gap would result in nearly 500,000 people escaping poverty and nearly 300 million 
USD added to annual GDP (UNDP, 2015). Nutritional outcomes are also compromised as a 
result. Empowerment of women leads to better nutritional outcomes for children because 
women are more likely to spend money on shared family resources compared to private goods 
(Meinzen-dick et al., 2014). Further, increasing agricultural productivity is associated with 
better nutritional outcomes (Pauw and Thurlow, 2011). Closing the gender gap would also 
lead to greater women's empowerment and lead to a more gender equal SSA (van den Bold et 
al., 2013). 
 
The gender gap in agricultural productivity can be attributed to a range of factors. Typically 
across SSA, women have less access to inputs (Gilbert et al. 2002, Meinzen-Dick et al. 2014), 
transportation (Ali et al., 2016), finance (Adegbite and Machethe, 2020), and agricultural 
extension (Gilbert et al. 2002, Manfre et al. 2013); lower fulfillment of land rights (Meinzen-
dick et al. 2014, Yokying and Lambrecht 2020); larger time burdens in terms of agricultural 
labor, unpaid household duties, and child care (Palacios-Lopez and Lopez, 2014); less 
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household bargaining power (Huyer, 2016); lower rates of technology adoption (Nyasimi and 
Huyer, 2017) and cash crop adoption (Ali et al., 2016); and higher vulnerability to climate 
change (Goh 2012, Van Aelst and Holvoet 2016). In recent decades, governments and 
international organizations have been trying to bridge the gender gap through gender-sensitive 
agricultural programs that address some of the issues listed above (FAO, 2013). 
 
Agricultural programs are designed to improve yields and build resilience to climate change 
impacts, often through promoting investments in new practices/approaches. These practices 
are usually new to the farmers, involve production and market risk, and require new 
household labor allocation. If their adoption improves among women, the gender gap can be 
reduced, potentially reducing the overall poverty level. For example, in the 2000s, the 
Malawian government ran the Farm Input Subsidy Program targeting half of its farmers. 
Households received vouchers for improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers. Fisher and 
Kandiwa (2014) looks at the differential effects of the program on woman household heads 
(typically unmarried, divorced, widowed, or the husband is away for six months or more each 
year) and married women living with man household heads. The program caused a 222% 
increase in improved maize adoption in plots managed by woman household heads. However, 
plots managed by married women living with man household heads did not increase improved 
maize adoption. While this experience can guide future policy on closing the gender gap for 
woman household heads, it was ineffective in improving married women's adoption of 
technology. Because most woman-headed plots are managed by married women, the program 
appeared to have little effect on closing the gender productivity gap overall (Karamba and 
Winters, 2015). However, married women make up a large portion of women in SSA, living 
households as 'man-headed' (Buvinic and Gupta, 1997). So gender-sensitive programs need to 
effectively target married women as well as woman household heads, addressing 
intrahousehold power dynamics and differences between men's and women's preferences 
(Doss, 2001; Doss et al., 2018; Rola & Rubzen et al., 2020). 
 
In the case of married couples, particularly, the differences between men's and women's risk 
preferences and assessment of their own and their spouse's labor costs might influence the 
investment in new agricultural practices. For instance, it has been shown that women, 
including women in agriculture, tend to be more risk-averse than men (Vieider et al., 2015), 
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and are thus less likely to make risky investments. Women in developing countries also have 
more domestic duties and perform more labor-intensive agricultural tasks, such as sowing, 
weeding, and harvesting (Heise et al., 2019). This could increase their marginal cost of labor 
(in terms of time). Since patriarchal norms call for women to provide more labor in household 
activities than men, men potentially undervalue their spouse's time while women overvalue 
their spouse's time. 
 
In light of these divergent behavioral preferences affecting agricultural investment, who 
makes investment decisions in small-scale agriculture (e.g. men, women, or both), and who 
works as a result of investment within the household might influence investment levels and 
outcomes of agricultural practices. The negotiating and bargaining process between men and 
women determines household investment strategies when there are conflicting preferences for 
potential investments. Understanding this bargaining process and the effects of women's 
involvement in decision making is crucial to designing programs to bridge the gender gap 
particularly.   
 
To understand the bargaining process and its effect of the women's involvement in decision 
growing number of the research study the role of women in agricultural households decision 
and livelihood. For instance, Sheahan & Barrett, 2014 use data from six  Sub-Saharan Africa 
and show that woman headed are less likely to adopt agricultural input than man headed 
households.  Shibata et al. (2020) utilized data from rural farmers in Uganda and find that 
adoption of agricultural innovations involve bargaining between spouses, and the power of 
the spouses in this bargaining is related to the social norms and their control over household 
assets.  Ngoma-Kasanda and Sichilima (2016) provide similar evidence from groundnut 
farmers in Zambia, reporting that household assets, distance to the field, household headship, 
cultural factors influence women's decision making in the household. Kawarazuka et al. 
(2018) use information from Ede community in Vietnam and find that men farmers have a 
higher power in farming decisions than their wives because they control farming machines 
(two-wheel tractors), and men farmers are not aware of the investment needs of women. 
There is also evidence suggesting that the involvement of women in household decision 
making is positively related to nutrition, livelihood, wellbeing, and resilience outcomes 
(please see Njuki et al. (2021) for a detailed review). A recent study by the CARE impact 
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evaluation team uses the randomized controlled trial to test whether a gender transformative 
approach empowering women in the household decision can improve adoption of agricultural 
technologies, household dietary diversity, and income in Burundi. The study found that 
empowering women improved dietary diversity and contributed to the improvement of other 
outcomes (CARE, 2021).    
 
Our study contributes to this growing literature, studying how women's involvement and 
household bargaining change decisions on risky agricultural investments requiring labor 
inputs of spouses. Specifically, we use a lab-in-the-field experiment with a real-effort task to 
measure rural man and woman spouses' different investment outcomes and compare them 
with their joint decision when labor costs and risks are present. Our sample includes 539 
married couples across fifteen villages in Iringa, Tanzania. Rural Tanzania and particularly 
the villages that we focus on is a suitable setting to analyze spousal investment decision-
making. 77% of working-age adults are in the agricultural sector, which makes up 28% of 
GDP. However, growth in the agricultural sector has grown slower than the national average 
(USAID, 2021). Women make up 52% of the labor share in agriculture (Chirsteansen, 2018), 
yet their adoption rate of technologies remains much lower than men's, particularly among 
married women. Because married women's adoption of technology or new crops generally 
requires spousal bargaining, understanding intra-household decision-making over adoption is 
critical to increasing agricultural production and women's empowerment (Theis et al., 2018). 
The households from the villages that we organize our experiments at are part of a climate-
smart agriculture (CSA) project. In the project, households need to invest in new inputs and 
their labor to implement the CSA practices, therefore, the decision that couples need to make 
in our experiment are relevant for the study context.  
 
In our experiment, couples were offered compensation to sort cups of beans in a forty-minute 
period. Couples were given an endowment and could use it to buy cups of unsorted beans, 
sort the cups (for a maximum of forty minutes), and return them for a monetary return, which 
depends on the type of beans they sorted. One type of beans offered a constant return of 67% 
if the cup was returned sorted, while another provided an uncertain return of either 0% or 
300% upon return of the sorted cups. After forty minutes, cups left unsorted were not given 
any compensation, and a refund could not be given (i.e. -100% return). We randomized who 
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in the couple performed the labor (men, women, or the couple could decide the person to sort) 
and the spouse making the purchase decision (man, women, or joint decision). The 
randomization of decision-makers and laborers allows for identifying the causal relationship 
between gender and decisions involving risk and labor costs (e.g. the adoption of a new crop). 
We compare the findings across groups and check for differences in investment behavior by 
the gender of decision-maker and laborer. After the experiment, couples were asked to 
(separately) complete a short exit survey to gauge their farm characteristics, demographics, 
risk preferences, bargaining power and labor costs within the household. We use these 
controls to provide robustness checks to our main statistical specifications. 
 
Our findings suggest that who decides in and works for an agricultural investment within a 
household matter for the gender gap in agricultural investments. Men purchase the same 
amount of' safe cups' as women but purchase more' risky cups', showing that they have higher 
and riskier investment levels. However, men end up leaving more unsorted cups and do not 
complete the tasks they invest in or are assigned to by their spouses, decreasing the overall 
efficiency of the investments. When couples decide jointly, they purchase the same amount of 
total cups that men would invest in alone. However, their allocation between risky cups and 
safe cups (or their investment portfolio mix) is different. Couples deciding jointly purchase 
the same level of risky cups as women would alone and purchase more safe cups instead, 
showing that bargaining decreases the market risks the couples take in contrast to the riskier 
choices of man spouses. Further, compared to women, fewer cups overall are assigned to man 
laborers – a difference almost entirely explained through an increase in risky cups assigned to 
women. Still, men complete sorting their assigned cups less often. These differences in 
allocations could be because men appear to carry higher production risk, and assigning them 
risky cups could exacerbate the riskiness of the allocation. 
 
These intra-household dynamics highlight the difficulties in closing the gender gap through 
technology and crop adoption in (predominately) man-headed households. Women invest less 
but are assigned more labor, which puts a burden on their already full schedule of agricultural 
and domestic duties. To understand why joint decision thereby household bargaining has a 
better investment performance than men invest alone, we use random assignment to laborer 
and explore whether women alone and household bargaining are more successful in detecting 
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the potential low returns to labor and therefore make better investment decisions. Our results 
show that when a couple makes the investment decision alone, they do not take into account 
the labor performance of their spouse. However, when they jointly decide, they invest less 
when the spouse assigned to labor is not expected to perform well. This implies that involving 
women in decision making reminds men that they do not sort beans well in our experimental 
setting. 
 
These results imply that, to improve the overall agricultural investment performance, 
programs must facilitate behavioral changes that help households in closing the gender gap. 
Those programs should empower women and involve women more in agricultural investment 
processes. To contribute to this policy discussion, we provide preliminary evidence on 
whether two women empowerment interventions, gender training and participation in VSLAs, 
which are both shown to have a positive effect on women empowerment (Bulte et al. 2016; 
Bulte et al. 2017, Karlan et al.,2017), are associated with the behavioral change in investment 
decisions. We specifically test whether investment decisions of couples get closer to women's 
preferences that are more efficient in our experimental context when women and men receive 
gender trainings or participate in (VSLAs). 
 
Our households show that in households where women attended gender training in the past 
twelve months, women allocate more of their endowment to the high-return, risky 
investments as sole decision-makers and are more likely to jointly bargain with their husbands 
to reduce the production risks when making decisions together. This led to more profitable 
woman investment decisions and more efficient joint decisions. We also find that in the 
households where women participate in savings and loan associations (VSLAs) men's 
investments are more in line with women's investment preferences, indicating that VSLAs 
have the potential to empower women (and men) in household investment decisions.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the experiment 
design, setting, and process. Section 3 describes the data used in the evaluation, while Section 
4 describes the empirical methodology used in comparing different outcomes between men, 
women, and joint decision-makers and laborers. We present the experiment results in Section 
5 and give a discussion and conclusion in Section 6. 
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2. Experiment Design, Sample, and Process  
2.1 Experiment Design 
To analyze the role of gender in labor-intensive investment decisions, we conduct a lab-in-
the-field experiment involving a real effort task. Real-effort tasks are non-trivial mental or 
physical tasks used in experimental settings to measure participants' labor response to a 
certain incentive structure (Lezzi et al., 2015). The real-effort task in our experiment involves 
sorting beans – a task employed in similar settings by (Bulte et al., 2020). Green-colored 
beans were mixed with either grey-colored or red-colored beans1 and placed in standard, 
disposable 65ml plastic cups, and couples were rewarded with cash for each cup of beans 
sorted in 40 minutes. To successfully sort a cup, they would need to place all green-colored 
beans in one cup and all of the grey/red-colored beans in another cup. Pre-testing showed that 
a fast bean-sorter could sort no more than 10 cups in 40 minutes. 
 
Participants had to decide on how many cups of beans to sort before they began sorting. They 
were not allowed to change their decision after the bean-sorting began. Couples were given an 
endowment of 3,000 Tsh (about 1.29 USD). They could purchase a cup of unsorted beans for 
300 Tsh (so they can by a maximum of 10 cups)2. Two types of cups were available to be 
purchased – cups of green-colored beans mixed with grey-colored beans (referred to as safe 
cups from here on) and cups of green-colored beans mixed with red-colored beans (referred to 
as risky cups from here on). If a participant successfully sorted a safe cup, they were paid 500 
Tsh (a return of 67% over the purchase price). If a participant successfully sorted a risky cup 
they would either be paid 900 Tsh (a 300% return) or 300 Tsh (a 0% return) with a 50% 
probability of each payment occurring. After sorting, the payment was determined by having 
participants draw a card from a full deck of playing cards. Drawing a red card indicated 
receiving the 0% return for all risky cups, and drawing a black card indicated receiving the 
300% return for all risky cups. Participants could also choose not to purchase a cup to sort 
and keep their endowment. Therefore, participants could purchase any combination of safe 
and risky cups ranging from zero to ten cups in total. Unsorted cups were given a payment of 
 
 
1 All of the beans were the same size. 
2 Respondents could not use their own cash to buy beans 
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0 Tsh (a 100% loss) such that participants lost any endowment they put towards purchasing 
cups they do not sort. 
 
To identify the role of gender in labor-intensive decision-making, we randomize the gender of 
the decision-maker (Treatment Arm 1) and the laborer (Treatment Arm 2) through a semi-
factorial design. In the first treatment arm, couples were randomly assigned to have woman 
spouse, man spouse, or both members (joint) decide how many and which cups to purchase. 
In the second treatment arm, couples were randomly assigned to have men or woman perform 
the bean sorting. The semi-factorial design is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Experiment Design 
Treatment Arm1: 
Decision making 
Treatment Arm 2   
 Man Woman Joint 
Man Man, Man Man, Woman NA 
Woman Woman, Man Woman, Woman NA 
Joint Joint, Man Joint, Woman Joint, Joint 
 
The joint labor treatment indicates that couples can jointly decide whether men or 
women perform the bean sorting. This treatment provides a' real-world' scenario, as 
labor assignment is not exogenously determined in households but rather endogenously 
decided upon by household members. Since the experiment does not have a traditional 
control group, the joint decision-making and joint labor decision provide a logical 
comparison group for the other seven treatment groups. 
 
In this experiment design, we are interested in seven main outcome variables: total 
number of cups purchased, the number of safe cups purchased, the number of risky cups 
purchased, the number of cups left unsorted, the expected return of a decision, the 
standard deviation of a decision's returns, and the final payment issued to participants. 
The total number of cups purchased relates to production risk, while the number of risky 
and safe cups relates to market risk. The number of unsorted cups is an indicator of 
inefficiency (or realizations of production risk) in investment decision-making. 
 
2.2 Sample 
The experiment took place across fifteen villages in Iringa, Tanzania. In the villages, CARE-
Tanzania implements Kukua ni Kujifunza  (KnK) project that has introduced climate-smart 
agriculture villages and soybean value chain through farmers field schools. The project 
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mainly targeted women farmers organized via farmer field schools. In addition to agronomic 
training, the project gave gender sensitization training. This training involves discussing 
wife’s and husband’s roles in the household and agricultural issues. The project also 
encouraged farmers to participate, save and invest in CSA practices (e.g., rhizobium 
inoculation, composting, soybean seeds, fertilizer) through village savings and loan 
associations in the villages. Therefore, increasing the investment of married women in 
agriculture, especially CSA practices, was a relevant topic in the study villages.    
The experiment included 521 couples m involving the project while not excluding others from 
the villages . Village officials and officials recruited couples from CARE to come to village 
offices and participate in the experiment .  There were two experiment sessions in each 
village: one in the morning and one in the afternoon. We aimed to have 18 couples participate 
in each session. If the quotas for a session were not met through recruitment (e.g. because of 
no-shows), then respondents were asked to contact additional couples to participate. 
The 521 couples were required to be married and involved in small-scale agriculture. Both 
members of the couple were required to be between 18 and 65 years of age. Verification of 
the eligibility requirements was carried out by village officials and was verified by checks in 
the survey administered to each participant. 
2.3 Experiment process 
The experiment took place outside of village offices in each village. While the setup slightly 
varied based on the location of the village office, a standard approach was taken to ensure that 
decisions were made in isolation and participants who had yet to begin the experiment could 
not see the bean-sorting area (i.e. they could not see what other couples had decided). This 
setup alleviated concerns over observability. Members of each couple were also separated at 
the beginning of each session so that they could not discuss the experiment before 
participating in it. A sample setup can be seen in Figure 13. 
 
 
3 The arrows indicate the direction in which participants went through the experiment. From the 
marketplace, one member went to the bean-sorting area and another to the survey area based on which 
treatment group to which the couple was assigned. 
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Figure 1: Example Experiment Setup 
Each session lasted about four hours, but individual couples were compensated and able to 
leave once they completed the experiment. Once at least ten couples arrived at the beginning 
of a session, the experiment began with a detailed explanation of the experiment process to 
the entire group. Couples who arrived after the first explanation were given a subsequent 
explanation. Respondents were able to ask questions at any point during the explanation. 
During the explanation, men were asked to sit away from women so that couples could not 
discuss the experiment before making a decision. 
 
After the explanation, couples were called one by one to register. At registration, they were 
required to give their names and ages and sign a consent form. Then both members of the 
couple practiced sorting one cup of beans in four minutes (1/10 of the time allotted for the 
bean-sorting in the experiment). This allowed the participants to understand their own and 
their spouse's ability in sorting beans. Before and after the practice bean-sorting, participants 
were asked questions about the experiment to test their understanding. If the participants did 
not have a firm understanding of the experiment, then the experimenters would explain the 
process again and then ask follow-up questions until the participants fully understood the 
process. A strict monitoring process was in place so that couples could not discuss the 




Participants then passed to the marketplace, where they were assigned to their treatment group 
by picking a slip with a treatment group from a bowl. Each couple only picked one slip. 
Before drawing a slip, the participants were once again asked about and could discuss their 
(mis)understanding of the experiment, particularly regarding the randomization process and 
decision options. After drawing a slip, the relevant participant(s) decided how many and 
which cups to purchase. If a sole decision-maker was assigned, the decision was made in the 
absence of their spouse. To make the decision, the experimenter handed the decision-maker(s) 
ten vouchers worth 300 Tsh each (for a total endowment of 3,000 Tsh). The decision-
maker(s) could then spend (or keep) their vouchers as they wished. Non-observability was 
ensured such that other participants could not view the marketplace. 
 
After the relevant participant(s) decided on how many and which cups to purchase, the cups 
were delivered to the bean-sorting area for the relevant participant to sort. The participant was 
given 40 minutes to sort the cups. Spouses who were not sorting beans were not allowed to 
help or observe their spouses sorting. 
 
Finally, both members of each couple were required to complete a 10-minute exit survey 
before receiving payment. Once both members of each couple completed all of the tasks, then 
the couples could deliver their sorted and unsorted beans to the marketplace and receive 
payment based on what they sorted. 
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Investment outcomes 
There are seven variables: the total number of cups purchased, the number of safe cups 
purchased, the number of risky cups purchased, the number of cups left unsorted, the 
expected return of the decision, the standard deviation of the decision's return, and the final 
payment. These variables were recorded on paper forms when participants made their 
decisions (in the case of the variables related to cups purchased) and the bean-sorting and 
payment areas (for unsorted cups). All recorded figures were cross-checked when payments 
were distributed to participants at the end of the experiment. Based on the four measures 
relating directly to the number of cups, we calculate the expected return and standard 
deviation of decision portfolios and use these as additional outcomes along with the final 
payment distributed to each couple.   
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3.2. Independent Variables 
The main independent variables are categorical variables for assignment to treatment groups. 
The levels of the categorical variables correspond to the groups defined in Table 1. When 
couples completed sorting beans in the experiment, we administered a short (less than ten 
minutes) exit survey to both men and woman in each couple. In the exit survey, we asked some 
questions to be used as control variables in our econometric specifications for robustness 
checks. Comparisons of these variables also give interesting insights into men and women's 
behavior. 
Each participant was asked after the experiment which spouse is better at sorting. Respondents 
could report that men are better, women are better, or both spouses sort beans equally well. We 
combined these answers to create a couple-level indicator variable for which spouse is better at 
sorting. If both spouses report women (man) as the better sorter, we indicate that women (man) 
are better at sorting beans. If one spouse says women (man) is better and the other says they are 
equal, then women (man) are indicated by the couple-level variable to better sort beans. If both 
spouses said they were equal, then neither spouse was determined to better at sorting, and if 
both spouses reported themselves as the best sorter, neither spouse was reported to be better. 
Based on these calculations, we create an indicator variable,  suboptimal, for whether the 
member of the couple who is relatively worse at sorting beans is assigned to be the laborer. 
This variable is equal to zero if the better sorter is assigned or if the spouses have an equal 
ability to sort. The variable is not defined for the couples assigned to decide which spouse sorts 
beans because this is an endogenous decision.  
In terms of demographics, individuals reported their ages and education levels. We qualitatively 
observed that age was a potential correlate of the number of cups purchased during the 
experiment. Household size may also be correlated with how spouses view labor costs, so we 
include this in the econometric specifications with controls. 
Respondents were also asked about their farm characteristics and participation in local 
organizations. Respondents reported their farm size in hectares and listed the two most 
important crops on their farms. They were also asked if they earn any income from activities in 
farming. We then inquired about knowledge and participation in local organizations/programs 




The next set of questions focused on spousal bargaining power related to the two most important 
crops (self-reported). We asked who is mostly responsible for decision-making with regards to 
each of the following: crop choice decisions, input decisions, and selling decisions. The 
respondents could reply with man, woman, joint, other man in the household, other women in 
the household, or others. We create an index of joint decision-making that simply adds the 
number of decisions that are made jointly between spouses. We then asked about income 
control concerning the two most important crops. We create a similar index equal to two if 
income from both crops is controlled jointly, one if only income from one crop is controlled 
jointly, and zero if no income is controlled jointly. Finally, we ask about labor divisions 
between men and woman in the household for the two main crops. We ask who is mainly 
responsible for land preparation, planting, weeding, harvesting, and selling. As with decision-
making and income control, we create a simple index for the extent of joint labor tasks in the 
household. 
To gauge individuals' risk preferences, we ask simple questions about individual's willingness 
to take risks (Vieider et al., 2015). We adopt the questions of (Vieider et al., 2015) to an 
agricultural setting. Individuals report on a scale of zero to ten of how willing they are to take 
risks in general and in certain situations (where 0 is completely unwilling and ten is completely 
willing). After asking about their general risk preferences, we asked about the willingness to 
take risks in farming in general, input decisions, new crop adoption, new technology adoption, 
and marketing. 
Finally, we asked questions about the experiment itself. To gauge preferences towards spousal 
cooperation, we asked spouses who were not assigned to bean sorting if they would rather be 
helping their spouse or resting. We then asked whether spouses thought they or their spouses 
were better at sorting and whether they believe their spouse gets more easily distracted than 
them. 
3.3 Participant characteristics 
Table 2 presents the participant characteristics by gender. Men reported larger farm areas than 
women by about 0.2 acres. The average household size has four members and 2.68 members 
work on the farm. However, the median number of farm laborers is 2, highlighting the 
importance of spousal bargaining in farm outcomes. 39% of households receive income from 
wage work. Nearly all households reported one of their two main crops as maize. The 
majority of respondents also responded that beans were one of the most important crops. 
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However, women were more likely to list beans than men. A small percentage of households 
listed a variety of other crops as being one of the most important. 
In terms of participation in local organizations, nearly all participants were aware of both a 
VLSA in their village and a Farmer Field School (FFS) . However, attendance differs among 
men and women. Women are more likely to attend gender training, marketing training, 
VSLA, and FFS. 
In contrast to Vieider et al. (2015), we find no statistical difference between men and women 
with regards to risk aversion measures. Men and women do not report different levels of joint 
decision-making, joint labor, or income control. And with regards to the experiment, 71% of 
women say they sort better than their husband while only 61% of men say that their wife sorts 
better. But, when asked which member of the couple gets distracted more easily (i.e. is less 
able to concentrate in general), both genders tend to think that they get more distracted than 
their spouse.  
 
 
Table 1: Participant Characteristics by Gender 
Variable Man Woman Diff 
Farm Area 3.09 2.87 -0.219 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.109) 
Household Size 5.08 5.12 0.047 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.124) 
Household Farm Laborers 2.68 2.71 0.036 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.071) 
Outside Income (Yes/No) 0.39 0.43 0.034 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.030) 
Main Crop: Maize 0.99 0.98 -0.006 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.007) 
Main Crop: Beans 0.56 0.61 0.053 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.030) 
Knowledge of VSLA 0.96 0.96 0.000 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.012) 
Knowledge of FFS 0.90 0.92 0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.018) 
Attended NGO Trainings 0.64 0.74 0.096 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.028) 
Attended VSLA 0.42 0.69 0.267 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.029) 
Attended FFS 0.57 0.64 0.070 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.030) 
Attend Marketing Training 0.50 0.54 0.047 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.031) 
Risk Aversion: General 6.23 6.03 -0.203 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.176) 
Risk Aversion: Farming in General 5.54 5.36 -0.177 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.178) 
Risk Aversion: Inputs 4.69 4.69 -0.002 
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Variable Man Woman Diff 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.173) 
Risk Aversion: Marketing 4.53 4.55 0.017 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.177) 
Risk Aversion: Crop Adoption 4.65 4.65 0.002 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.182) 
Risk Aversion: Tech. Adoption 5.02 4.96 -0.058 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.166) 
Involved in Farm Management 0.98 0.98 0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.009) 
Joint Decision-Making Index 2.14 2.12 -0.021 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.079) 
Joint Labor Index 0.92 0.92 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.012) 
Income Control Index 0.49 0.48 -0.009 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.025) 
Woman Sorts Better 0.60 0.71 0.107 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.029) 
Spouse More Distracted 0.28 0.26 -0.024 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.027) 
N 531 531 1062 
Desire to Help Spouse Sort 0.67 0.85 0.179*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.037) 
N 286 241 527 
Significance levels:  < 10%  < 5%  < 1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses 
4. Empirical methodology 
4.1 Preliminary checks 
Before testing differences in outcomes during the experiment, we conduct several tests to 
ensure that the randomization was carried out properly and ensured balanced samples across 
groups. We check for balance across the seven treatment groups and across those assigned to 
have the relatively less productive spouse sort. Those were not assigned to have the relatively 
less productive bean sorter perform labor.  
To test for balance across the seven treatment groups, we perform iterative t-tests comparing 
each group across the covariates discussed above. The iterative t-tests first compare the mean 
covariate values of Treatment Group 1 to Treatment Groups 2 through 7, then Treatment Group 
2 to Treatment Groups 3 through 7, and so on. Twenty-one comparisons are made for each 
variable using this method. We count the number of statistically significant differences found 
in all comparisons for each variable with the idea that around five percent of the differences 
should be statistically significant if using a 95% confidence test. The results of these 
comparisons are presented in Table A.A1 in the Appendix. Only farm area and the order in 
which the couple experimented within their session do not appear to be balanced across groups. 
Those assigned to joint decision-making for labor decisions appear to partake in the experiment 
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later in each session. Since the research team did not know the area of any of the participant's 
farms and the assignment to each experimental group was completely random, these differences 
can only be explained as oddities arising from the randomization. Nevertheless, we control for 
all of the covariates in robustness checks to ensure that our analysis shows the true effect of the 
randomized assignment on experiment outcomes.  
We then perform a similar check for balance across covariates for couples assigned to have the 
relatively less productive member sort beans and those assigned to have the relatively more 
productive member and equally productive spouse sort. We perform student t-tests across both 
groups along the covariates discussed earlier. The results are displayed in Table Appendix 
Table A.A2 and show that couples were successfully balanced across observables for these 
groups. 
4.2 Estimation Strategy 
4.2.1 Main results 
The empirical analysis of the experiment relies on randomized assignment to identify the effects 
of gender and bargaining on outcome variables in the game. The main analysis first compares 
mean outcomes by the gender of the decision-maker and joint decision-making (Treatment Arm 
1). The comparison is made specifically in three groups: Man spouse vs. woman spouse 
decision-making, man spouse vs. joint decision-making, and woman spouse vs. joint decision-
making. To test these results, the following regression model is tested:  
 (1) 
where i denotes the couple,  is a vector of outcomes,  and  
equals 1 when women are the decision-maker (0 otherwise) and   equals 1 
when couple decides jointly (0 otherwise).  is an idiosyncratic error term. The base of 
 and  is man decision-makers.  ( ) estimates the 
difference between the investment outcomes of women (joint) investment decisions compared 
to the outcomes of men.  
An analogous approach is used when estimating differences in means between couples 
randomly assigned different laborers (Treatment Arm 2). To test these differences, the 




where  equals 1 when women are assigned to sort  (0 otherwise) and 
 equals 1 when the couple jointly decides who will sort (0 otherwise).  is an 
idiosyncratic error term. The base category is the men is assigned to sort beans in the 
experiment.  ( ) estimates the difference between the outcomes of women (joint) laborer 
compared to men investment decisions. Standard errors are estimated in the same manner as in 
Equation 1 above.  
4.2.2 Analysis of the investment decision under sub-optimal labor allocation, 
Why do investment decisions change when the household make investment decision jointly? 
To shed some light on this, we examine the change in investment decisions when a spouse with 
low returns to labor is assigned to the task. Our experiments randomize the spouse assigned for 
sorting beans, implying that spouses with low returns to labor are randomly assigned to sorting 
beans.  We define those assignments as suboptimal allocation of household labor. Table A.A2 
(in the Appendix) shows that those assigned to a 'sub-optimal' laborer and those assigned to an 
optimal laborer (i.e. the laborer with relatively high marginal returns) are balanced across the 
additional covariates.  
Using the definition of suboptimal allocation, we first test whether suboptimal allocation affects 
the overall investment decisions of the couple. The model takes the form:  
  (3) 
where  is an indicator variable for whether the couple is assigned to have the 
relatively less productive (i.e. sub-optimal) spouse sort beans. The base of  is 
couples in which the relatively more productive spouse sorts or both spouse are equally 
productive. In this analysis, we exclude the couples assigned to the group in which couples 
decide which spouse sorts the beans are excluded from the estimation of Equation 3 (because 
those couples endogenously decide labor assignment).  is the difference in outcomes between 
couples with sub-optimal labor allocations imposed on them and those who do not have such 
labor allocations imposed on them.  
Next we test whether the women, men, or join investment decisions changes when there is a 
suboptimal labor allocation, using the following model:   
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             (4) 
From the model we test  to investigate whether investment decision of women change 
and check  to examine whether joint investment decision changes under suboptimal 
labor allocation.  
Finally we also investigate the change in investment outcomes under suboptimal labor 
allocation.  
                                                                                                                (5) 
where we test  to examine whether the investment decisions change when women are 
assigned as laborer and but returns to their labor is low – suboptimal.  
4.2.3 Heterogeneity analysis 
Can programs such as gender training or VSLAs change investment decisions? To test this 
tentatively, we investigate the heterogeneity in investment decisions by women's and men's 
participation in gender training or VSLAs in the past 12 months.  
We test the relationship between participating gender training or VSLAs and investment 
outcomes using the following econometric specification. We estimate this model for 
participation in gender training and VSLAs separately  
                                                          
(6) 
where g indicates whether women or men participated in the gender training (VSLA). 
 is an indicator variable equals 1 for whether men/women attended gender 
(VSLA)  in the past twelve months (0 otherwise). We test  to understand whether the 
participation is positively associated when men decide on the investment. We examine 
whether participation to training or VSLA changes the decision of the woman spouse and 




4.2.4 Estimation strategy and robustness check 
To estimate the models above, we use Poisson models for our count data outcome variables: 
the total number of cups, number of risky cups, number of safe cups, or the number of 
unsorted cups because these are all count variables. For expected portfolio return, portfolio 
standard deviation, and final payment, OLS is used for the estimation of coefficients and 
standard errors. We do not cluster standard errors in the main analysis for analysis of 
differences in means of Treatment Arm 1 (decision-making), Treatment Arm 2 (labor 
assignment), and sub-optimal labor allocations. Since the treatment was assigned individually, 
and we do not attempt to make claims about the population as a whole, the standard errors 
should not be clustered (Robinson, 2020). For robustness, we cluster the standard errors at the 
treatment-session level. See Appendix B for these results. 
Since the couples are allocated randomly to the treatment arms, we present the main results 
without control variables and fixed effects. To test for the robustness of the results from the 
models above, we condition the comparison of means on the control variables. These control 
variables also include, session and village fixed effects and the order in which the participants 
began the experiment in each session. We estimate the modes again using appropriate 
distributional assumptions. In the robustness checks, we cluster standard errors at the 
treatment group-session level to account for correlations between couples assigned to the 
same treatment group within the same session.  The robust results with controls and fixed 
effects are presented in Appendix B. 
5. Results 
5.1 The 'Natural-Case': The Joint-Joint Group 
The 'Joint-Joint’ group refers to the randomization group that makes decisions jointly and 
decides which spouse sorts beans. This group is intended to provide a ‘natural’ case – the 
most similar scenario to the real world. Out of the 76 couples assigned to this group, only 20 
(26%) chose men to sort, while 56 (74%) chose women to sort. These choices can reflect two 
factors. First, women tend to be better at sorting, so the optimal decision is to decide that 
women sort in many cases. 86% of the couples assigned to this group chose the partner who 
the spouses believe is better at sorting to sort. Second, this tendency to decide that women 
sort can reflect the fact that women tend to have higher labor burdens than men in agricultural 
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and household duties (Palacios-Lopez, Christiaensen, & Kilic, 2017). Therefore, assigning 
labor costs to women is consistent with labor allocations in small-scale farming households.  
 
Table 2 displays the experiment outcomes for the joint-joint group. We test for differences 
between couples who chose men to sort and those who chose women to sort, but due to the 
low sample size (particularly for man laborers), these results should be interpreted with 
extreme caution. The average couple chose to sort 5.86 cups with significant differences 
between the number of cups chosen for man and woman laborers. When men sorts, couples 
purchase 1.2 more cups. This difference is driven solely by an increase in investment in safe 
cups – the number of risky cups purchased is equivalent for man and woman laborers.  
Despite higher investment levels for man laborers, payment levels are not significantly 
different for man and woman laborers. While couples purchase more cups for man laborers, 
man laborers leave 1.2 cups unsorted on average – an amount equivalent to the difference in 
investment levels between man and woman laborers.  This suggests that couples over-invest 
when choosing men to sort and could not realize the returns on this extra investment.   
 
Table 2: Outcomes for Joint -Joint Decision -Makers 
Variable   Chose  
Man  
 Chose Woman   Diff (F-M) Total 
Total Cups  6.75 5.54 -1.214* 5.86  
[0.74] [0.41] [0.812]  [0.36] 
Safe Cups  4.6 3.41 -1.189** 3.72  
[0.93] [0.41] [0.886]  [0.39] 
Risky Cups  2.15 2.12 -0.025 2.13  
[0.65] [0.39] [0.760]  [0.33] 
Unsorted Cups  1.2 0.46    -0.736***  0.65  
[0.37] [0.15] [0.328]  [0.15] 
Expected Return  4565 4319.64 -245.357 4384.21 
 [166.11] [105.82] [203.078]  [89.70] 
Investment Std. Dev.  0.21 0.21 -0.001 0.21  
[0.06] [0.03] [0.065]  [0.03] 
Payment  4295 4057.14 -237.857 4119.74 
 [304.74] [136.32] [291.283]  [127.98] 
N  20 56 76 
 
Significance levels:    * < 10%    ** < 5%    *** < 1%   
Standard errors in brackets. For Total Cups, Grey Cups, Red Cups and  Unsorted Cups, standard errors 
are calculated using a Poisson Distribution. For Investment Std. Deviation, Expected Return, and 
Payment, standard errors are calculated using a normal distribution, and significance levels are found 
using a student T-Test.   
5.2 Outcomes by Decision-Maker 
We now move away from the natural case and analyze what happens to experiment outcomes 
when labor and decision-making genders are imposed. Table 3 summarizes our key findings on 
how investment preferences change by the gender of the decision-maker in the household and 
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under joint decision-making. Columns 2-4 of the Table report the average investment outcomes 
of the experiment - number of safe and risky cups invested, the corresponding expected return 
and variability (standard deviation) of their investment - when man and woman spouses decide 
alone or jointly. It also shows the average actual outcomes of those decisions regarding unsorted 
cups and actual return (payment) received by the spouses. Columns 5-7 report the differences 
in outcomes between man and woman spouses’ decisions, man spouse and joint decision-
making, and woman-spouse and joint decision-making using the estimates from model 2 
without any control variables. The detailed econometric results in the Appendix show that our 
results are robust to controlling for the treatment arm’s order, participant characteristics, and 
session effects. Finally, we also present detailed experiment outcomes at the treatment arm level 
in Figure 2 and refer to those to explain our key findings. 
Men and woman spouses have different investment choices for total cups purchased, and the 
mix of cups purchase when they invest alone (Table 3). Man spouses solely choose about half 
a cup more than women on average (5.80 total cups vs 5.28 total cups). The difference in total 
cups picked is driven by increased investment in risky cups by men. Man and woman spouses 
deciding alone choose similar amounts of safe cups (2.96 and 3.03, respectively), but men 
choose about 0.63 more risky cups on average than women (2.84 vs 2.24). Figure 2 shows that 
average investment behavior does not change significantly by the gender of the spouse assigned 
to work as a result of the investment. Compared to women, men take more risks for the 
household, and as Table 3 shows, their decisions lead to higher expected returns and a high 
standard deviation investment portfolio. 
Table 3: Outcome Variables by Decision-Maker 
Variable   Woman   Man   Joint   Diff (M-W)  Diff (M-J)  Diff (W-J) 
       
Total Cups  5.28 5.80 5.73 0.525* 0.07 -0.456*  
[0.25] [0.27] [0.21] [0.27] [0.25] [0.25] 
Safe Cups  3.03 2.96 3.48 -0.075 -0.523*** -0.448**  
[0.25] [0.28] [0.22] [0.20] [0.19] [0.19] 
Risky Cups  2.24 2.84 2.25 0.6*** 0.592*** -0.007  
[0.24] [0.27] [0.19] [0.19] [0.17] [0.16] 
Unsorted Cups  0.59 0.82 0.69 0.239** 0.134 -0.105  
[0.11] [0.13] [0.09] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] 
Expected Return  4280.27 4445.27 4372.12   164.998*  73.146 -91.852  
[64.46] [71.96] [51.76] [96.64]  [86.49]  [82.59]  
Investment Std. Dev.  0.23 0.27 0.23 0.042 0.04 -0.001  
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.03]  
Payment  3980.27 4194.59 4085.4 214.322 109.196 -105.126  
[95.10] [118.85] [78.53] [152.34]  [136.61]  [123.95]  
N  147 148 226 295 374 373 
Column 2-4 presents average outcomes listed in the first row for man-spouse, woman-spouse, and joint decisions. 
Column 5-7 show the differences between those three groups. Significance levels:  < 10%  < 5%  < 1%. Standard 
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errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for total cups, grey cups, red cups, and unsorted cups differences are 
estimated from Poisson distribution using the delta method. Standard errors for expected return and Investment 
Std. Dev. Differences are estimated from a standard normal distribution (student T-test). 
When couples decide jointly through bargaining, spouses compromise by following men 
preferences for the number of cups (more cups) and woman preferences for a mix of cups (safe 
cups instead of risky cups). In joint couple decisions, the total number of cups (5.73) is 
statistically similar to man spouse decisions (5.80) and higher than the number of cups 
purchased by woman spouses (5.28). Jointly deciding, couples purchase at least 0.60 fewer 
risky cups and 0.52 more safe cups than men’s purchase alone. Hence, men win the negotiation 
on the number of cups purchased, but women win the negotiation to buy the type of cups. This 
shows that couples compromise by following men’s preferences for the investment quantity 
and the women’s preferences for portfolio composition.  
However, the high investment ambitions of man spouses do not lead to significantly better 
payoffs because they also result in more failed investments (i.e. cups that remain unsorted). The 
table shows that the actual payments from the experiment do not change significantly by the 
decision-maker. This is because about 0.82 cups, about 15% of the total cups purchased, are 
left unsorted when men spouse invests – 0.24 cups more unsorted cups than when women 
decide alone. Figure 2 shows that the high investment levels leading to unsorted cups are 
particularly observed in the man-man treatment arm (where the man spouse decides how many 
cups to purchase and is assigned to sort the cups). This implies that man spouses underestimate 




Figure 2: Experiment outcomes by treatment group 
Notes to the Figure: In man-man treatment, man spouse purchase cups and he sorts. In man-woman treatment, man 
spouse purchases the cups and woman spouse sorts. In joint-man treatment, spouses jointly purchase cups and man 
spouse sorts. In joint-woman treatment, spouses jointly 
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5.3 Outcomes by Laborer 
Now we turn to our results for investment preferences and outcomes by the gender of the spouse 
assigned to work. Columns 2-4 of Table 4 report the average outcomes, and Columns 5-7 of 
Table 4 show the investment differences between the labor assignment to man spouses, woman 
spouses, and a joint decision of which spouse works. This table estimates Model 2 without any 
control variables and compares the estimates between the different treatment arm assignments 
in Treatment Arm 2. The detailed econometric results (Tables A.B1-A.B7 in the Appendix) 
show that these results are robust to controlling for the treatment arm’s order, participant 
characteristics, and village and session effects. 
 
Table 4: Outcomes Variables by Laborer  
Variable   Woman   Man   Joint   Diff (M-W)  Diff (M-J)  Diff (W-J) 
Total Cups  5.79 5.37 5.86 -0.418* -0.481 -0.063  
[0.21] [0.21] [0.36] [0.22] [0.32] [0.32] 
Safe Cups  3.18 3.05 3.72 -0.127 -0.669*** -0.542**  
[0.22] [0.21] [0.39] [0.17] [0.25] [0.32] 
Risky Cups  2.61 2.32 2.13 -0.291* 0.188 0.479**  
[0.21] [0.20] [0.33] [0.15] [0.20] [0.20] 
Unsorted Cups  0.5 0.92 0.66  0.418***  0.26** -0.158  
[0.07] [0.12] [0.15] [0.08] [0.11] [0.10] 
Expected Return  4419.47 4306.85 4384.21 -112.62 -77.361 35.259  
[55.07] [53.86] [89.70] [77.08]  [105.61]  [108.29]  
Investment Std. Dev.  0.25 0.24 0.21 -0.018 0.023 0.041  
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.024]  [0.03]  [0.03]  
Payment  4286.73 3868.95 4119.74  -417.776***  -250.787 166.989  
[88.81] [79.86] [127.98] [119.66]  [155.14]  [170.22]  
N  226 219 76 445 295 302 
Column 2-4 presents average outcomes listed in the first row for three groups: man-spouse , woman-spouse assigned 
to work, the spouse jointly decided to work. Column 5-7 show the differences between those three groups. 
Significance levels:  < 10%  < 5%  < 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for total cups, grey 
cups, red cups, and unsorted cups differences are estimated from Poisson distribution using the delta method. 
Standard errors for expected return and Investment Std. Dev. differences are estimated from a standard normal 
distribution (student T-test). 
 
We find differences in investment preferences and outcomes depending on the gender of the 
spouse assigned to perform the labor-intensive sorting task. Table 4 shows that man spouses 
are assigned to sort about 0.4 fewer total cups and 0.3 fewer risky cups than women spouses 
assigned to work. This decreases the expected return of the investment portfolio by about 112 
Tsh. The detailed investment levels in Figure 2 show that this result is mainly driven by two 
treatment arms in which man spouses are assigned to sort beans: (i) women spouse decides 
alone on the cups to be sorted, and man spouse is assigned to sort; (ii) the couple decides jointly 
on the number of cups to be sorted, and man spouse is assigned to sort. In those treatments, 
women spouse’s investment in risky cups is significantly less than the treatment arms in which 
the woman spouse is assigned to work, and she decides alone or jointly with man spouse on the 
number of cups to be invested. She does this by investing in fewer risky cups to decrease the 
overall risk. These results show that woman spouses expect that man spouses will not be good 
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at sorting beans. The exit survey result confirms this, reported that 60% of men and 71% of 
women said that women partner was better at sorting. 
 
Women’ perceptions of men are confirmed by the actual performance of men spouses in bean 
sorting. When work is assigned to man spouses, men leave about 0.9 unsorted cups, 0.4 more 
than women leave on average. Interestingly, the percentage of unsorted cups of total cups 
assigned to men is 16%-17% across all decision-makers and does not change by the number of 
total cups to be sorted. This shows that the bean sorting skills of man spouses do not explain 
the high number of unsorted cups left by men, and they do not do their best in the experiment. 
Instead, men perceive that their effort for this task is very costly, and they were perhaps bored 
of the task and left those cups unsorted. The exit survey findings are also in line with this 
interpretation of the result. The survey hypothetically asked spouses not assigned to sort beans 
whether they would desire to help their spouse in bean sorting to earn more money if they were 
allowed to help them. 67% of men answered ‘yes’ compared to 85% of women, showing that, 
although they would receive payment, fewer men prefer working in this labor-intensive job 
compared to women. 
 
As a result of the lower initial investment in higher-paying risky cups and unsorted cups, when 
men spouse is assigned to be the laborer, the household’s actual earning from the investment 
decreases. Households with man spouses assigned to sort beans earn about 418 Tsh less than 
the households with woman spouses assigned to work. Overall, these results show that the 
success of the investment in labor-intensive tasks depends on who will perform the job in the 
household and performs better when women are assigned to work due to man spouses’ dislike 
of those labor-intensive tasks. 
5.4 Bargaining Under Sub-Optimal Labor Allocations 
Returns to labor differ within households, and households must make decisions for both 
laborers with relatively high returns and laborers with relatively low returns. By randomizing 
the laborer assigned to sort beans, we randomize whether the person with relatively low 
returns sorts. We define such an assignment as a ‘sub-optimal labor allocation. Table A.A2 in 
Appendix A shows that those assigned to a ‘sub-optimal laborer and those assigned to an 
optimal laborer (i.e., the laborer with relatively high marginal returns) are balanced across the 
additional covariates.  
 
Table 5 shows the differences in means between sub-optimal and optimal laborers. Decision-
makers assigned slightly fewer cups to sub-optimal laborers (0.8). Laborers with relatively 
low returns sort 0.44 fewer cups, and couples in these groups receive about 354 Tsh less than 
couples in which the optimal laborer is randomly assigned. These results are as expected – the 
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less productive member in couples performs worse and yields worse outcomes.  
 
Table 5: Effect of Sub-Optimal Labor Allocation on Experiment Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






       
Sub-Optimal -0.0856* -0.106 -0.0694 0.444*** -0.0208 -353.6*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0671) (0.0592) (0.115) (0.0260) (130.8) 
Order Controls No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
When given the task of choosing investment levels for a laborer with relatively low returns, 
do men, women, and joint decision-makers respond differently?  
Table 6 shows that when men decide on a sub-optimal laborer, they do not change the total 
number of cups they invest in compared to when the optimal laborer is assigned (row 1). This 
leads to inefficient investment decisions – about 0.73  more cups are left unsorted, and 
payments are 455 Tsh lower when compared to cases of optimal labor allocation. Woman 
participants fair slightly better. They do not change their investment behavior either, but since 
their investment levels are already lower than men’s, woman decision-makers avoid 
additional unsorted cups and losses in payment when the sub-optimal laborer is assigned.  
 
Only the joint decision-makers change their behavior when a sub-optimal laborer is assigned. 
Joint decision-makers lower the total amount of cups that they invest in. This is driven by a 
reduction in investment in safe cups. As a result, joint decision-makers choose investment 
levels that result in 0.57 fewer unsorted cups. However, the reduction in investment levels and 
unsorted cups does not mean that joint decision-makers receive higher payments than 
individual decision-makers when a sub-optimal laborer is assigned. Table 7 shows that the 
results do not change by whether men or women are the sub-optimal laborer.  
 
These results indicate that joint decision-making can lead to more optimal investment-labor 
allocations. When a laborer has relatively low returns, individual decision-makers assign 
labor as if they were assigning it to the more productive spouse. However, joint decision-
makers reduce labor allocations to the less productive member. This indicates that spouses are 
discussing with each other and making more sensible decisions – they are ‘talking each other 





Table 6: Effect of Sub-Optimal Labor Allocation on Experiment Outcomes by Decision-
Makers 










       
Sub-Optimal 0.0256 -0.0947 0.136 0.729*** -0.0296 -454.8** 
 (0.0743) (0.109) (0.102) (0.181) (0.0455) (227.9) 
       
Woman Decision-
Maker 
-0.0757 -0.235*** 0.0657 -0.194 -0.0525 -339.5* 
 (0.0591) (0.0866) (0.0812) (0.185) (0.0351) (176.2) 
       
Joint Decision-
Maker 
0.0553 -0.198** 0.263*** 0.0694 -0.0290 -86.12 
 (0.0571) (0.0857) (0.0776) (0.173) (0.0351) (176.2) 




-0.0645 -0.00529 -0.131 -0.352 0.0367 421.3 
 (0.108) (0.164) (0.145) (0.287) (0.0643) (322.5) 




-0.270** -0.0250 -0.471*** -0.567** -0.00857 -105.9 
 (0.108) (0.161) (0.145) (0.273) (0.0636) (318.9) 
Order Controls No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 7: Effect of Sub-Optimal Labor Allocation on Experiment Outcomes by Laborers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






       
Sub-Optimal -0.0718 -0.0716 -0.0720 0.191 -0.0260 -227.7 
 (0.0586) (0.0892) (0.0778) (0.145) (0.0345) (172.2) 
       
Woman 
Laborer 
0.0336 0.0746 0.00136 -0.475*** 0.000766 271.9* 
 (0.0520) (0.0786) (0.0693) (0.149) (0.0312) (155.8) 




0.0911 0.145 0.0449 -0.721 0.0767 586.9 
 (0.146) (0.213) (0.199) (0.603) (0.0887) (442.8) 
Order Controls No No No No No No 
Survey 
Controls 
No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5.5 Heterogeneity analysis 
5.5.1 Direct Empowerment Programs: Gender Training Participation 
Can the investment behavior of women in the household bargaining process change via 
gender training? We give a tentative answer to this question, testing whether the investment 
decisions and outcomes from our experiment change in the households with women attending 
gender training organized by an NGO in the past twelve months. 
 
 
Table 8 and Table 9 show the estimation results of Equation 5, testing the experimental 
investment outcomes of woman spouse and joint decision-making by the training attendance 
by men and women, respectively. The results indicate that women who attend gender training 
and are assigned the sole decision-making role in the experiment purchase similar amounts of 
cups to women who did not attend, but choose a different mix of cups. The estimate for the 
interaction term for woman decision-making and training shows that, on average, women who 
attend gender training choose 0.36 fewer safe cups and 0.31 more risky cups than those who 
do not– a nearly exact trade-off from the safe cups to the risky cups. These results show those 
woman spouses who participated in the training are more entrepreneurial and take more risks 
than those who do not. Further, in couples where women attended gender training, man 
decision-makers choose 0.23 fewer risky cups and 0.4 more safe cups, indicating that their 
decisions are more reflective of woman preferences than men in couples in which women did 
not attend gender training.    
 
When men attend gender training, their investment levels are higher and riskier (similar to 
woman decision-making results when women attend). Men who attended gender training 
invested in 0.16 more cups, reduced allocations to safe cups, and increased allocations to 
risky cups by 0.71. This resulted in both higher expected return and higher payments when 
compared to man decision-makers who do not attend training. Women in couples in which 
men attended gender training do almost exactly the opposite – they reduce total investments 
by 0.22 cups, increase their allocation to safe cups by 0.29, and reduce investments in risky 
cups by 0.86 when compared to women in the couple in which men did not attend. 










Table 8: Decision-Making Outcomes by Women's Gender Training Attendance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 












        
Woman -0.0974 0.280** -0.456*** -0.0464 -224.1 -0.104* -320.5 
 (0.0981) (0.141) (0.141) (0.281) (180.7) (0.0564) (281.5) 
        
Joint 0.184** 0.579*** -0.199* 0.258 163.2 -0.0550 112.6 
 (0.0847) (0.125) (0.119) (0.243) (166.8) (0.0521) (259.9) 
        
Woman attended 
Gender Training 
0.0721 0.405*** -0.228** 0.318 14.64 -0.0617 123.5 
 (0.0763) (0.116) (0.103) (0.215) (145.9) (0.0456) (227.3) 
        
Woman # Woman 
attended Gender 
Training 
-0.000222 -0.341** 0.311* -0.400 78.19 0.0862 135.5 
 (0.114) (0.161) (0.165) (0.325) (211.5) (0.0661) (329.5) 
        
Joint # Woman 
attended Gender 
Training 
-0.263*** -0.554*** -0.0259 -0.585** -306.4 0.0241 -296.8 
 (0.0991) (0.142) (0.143) (0.280) (194.2) (0.0607) (302.6) 
Order Controls No No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes: Man spouse deciding on the investment levels is the base category. 
 
However, this does not suggest that men attending gender training have a negative influence 
on the woman's investment decisions. On the contrary, women in couples in which men 
attended the training have more bargaining power than women in couples in which men did 
not attend. When making joint decisions, couples make decisions more in line with women's 
preferences when men attend gender training. Table 3 shows that overall, couples choose an 
investment level in line with man preferences and an investment mix in line with woman 
preferences when jointly bargaining. However, if men attend gender training, women gain 
more. Table 9 shows that when men attend gender training, couples jointly deciding invest in 
fewer total cups and fewer risky cups. This shows that women are more successfully 
negotiating their preferences if men attend gender training than those who do not.  These 
negotiation results are even more favorable to woman spouses than when only women attend 
gender training, indicating that including men in gender training is imperative to improving 
women's bargaining power.   
 
Table 9: Decision-Making Outcomes by Men's Gender Training Attendance 














        
Woman Decision-
Maker 
0.0508 -0.151 0.367*** -0.530** 130.5 0.0684 261.0 
 (0.0862) (0.111) (0.139) (0.253) (160.3) (0.0496) (249.1) 
        
Joint Decision- 0.118 0.125 0.105 -0.230 149.6 0.0200 31.46 
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(0.131) (0.199) (140.5) (0.0435) (218.3) 
        
Man attended 
Gender Training 




(0.118) (0.188) (137.9) (0.0427) (214.3) 
        
Woman # Man 
attended Gender 
Training 
-0.220** 0.287** -0.856*** 0.272 -455.8** -0.170*** -723.9** 
 (0.105) (0.140) (0.165) (0.305) (197.6) (0.0612) (307.0) 
        
Joint # Man 
attended Gender 
Training 
-0.200** 0.0569 -0.448*** 0.0837 -346.5* -0.0921* -213.0 
 (0.0927) (0.121) (0.152) (0.250) (176.6) (0.0547) (274.3) 
Order Controls No No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 10 reports the estimation results for the investment outcomes by laborer and woman 
spouse’s participation in gender training. We focus on the interaction terms (Woman × 
training and Joint × training), testing to test the difference in numbers of cups assigned to 
women compared to the number of cups assigned to men when women participated in the 
training. We also check whether those differences influence the investment outcomes. Our 
findings show that women’s participation in gender training does not play a major role in the 
number of cups assigned to sort. We only find that the interaction term for women assigned to 
work and training is statistically significant for unsorted cups, despite not being assigned 
fewer cups. This could reflect a difference in the motivation of attendees and non-attendees 
rather than the influence of training on labor outcomes. 
 
Table 10: Labor Outcomes by Women's Gender Training Attendance 














        
Woman Laborer 0.103 0.0980 0.108 -0.0597 143.3 0.00678 474.3* 
 (0.0833) (0.115) (0.121) (0.240) (159.5) (0.0498) (246.5) 
        
Joint Laborer 0.277*** 0.298** 0.253* 0.163 411.2** 0.0431 372.5 
 (0.0941) (0.129) (0.138) (0.268) (192.5) (0.0601) (297.4) 
        
Woman attended 
Gender Training 
0.0177 0.129 -0.122 0.352** -9.950 -0.0237 41.17 
 (0.0640) (0.0870) (0.0949) (0.168) (119.2) (0.0372) (184.2) 
        
Woman Laborer x 
Woman attended 
Gender Training 
-0.0365 -0.0862 0.0308 -0.719*** -36.32 0.0168 -75.02 
 (0.0953) (0.130) (0.140) (0.275) (182.2) (0.0569) (281.5) 
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Joint Laborer x 
Woman attended 
Gender Training 
-0.291** -0.140 -0.577*** -0.720** -488.1** -0.0969 -176.7 
 (0.117) (0.154) (0.184) (0.334) (231.9) (0.0724) (358.2) 
Order Controls No No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 11 shows the results of the experiment for when men attend gender training. The 
coefficient for Woman x Man Attended Gender Training on unsorted cups is positive (but 
insignificant), indicating that women and men in couples in which men attended gender 
training leave similar amounts of cups unsorted. As in Table 10 above, this could reflect 
higher motivation levels for man participants.  
 
Table 11: Labor Outcomes by Men's Gender Training Attendance 












        
Woman 0.0322 0.0590 -0.0142 -0.849*** 33.28 -0.000968 527.5*** 
 (0.0672) (0.0844) (0.111) (0.201) (128.8) (0.0400) (198.1) 
        
Joint -0.0334 0.0452 -0.181 -0.828*** -70.46 -0.0260 242.1 
 (0.0940) (0.115) (0.162) (0.300) (176.5) (0.0548) (271.5) 
        
Man attended 
Gender Training 
-0.0430 -0.198** 0.172* -0.177 -7.646 0.0427 170.1 
 (0.0608) (0.0792) (0.0960) (0.145) (114.8) (0.0356) (176.6) 
        
Woman # Man 
attended 
Gender Training 
0.0660 -0.0368 0.194 0.374 124.3 0.0306 -167.9 
 (0.0838) (0.109) (0.133) (0.248) (160.3) (0.0498) (246.6) 
        
Joint # Man 
attended 
Gender Training 
0.187 0.243* 0.151 0.740** 238.6 0.00761 23.54 
 (0.117) (0.146) (0.195) (0.353) (222.9) (0.0692) (342.7) 
Order Controls No No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
5.5.2 Indirect Empowerment Programs: VSLA Participation 
Does participation in programs that can indirectly enhance agency have similar associations 
with experiment outcomes as gender training? A local NGO facilitated VSLA programs, and 
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respondents were asked if they attended a VSLA in the past years. Table 12 shows the results 
of the experiment by VSLA attendance of woman participants and randomized decision-
making groups. When women attend the VSLA, their decision-making in the program is not 
significantly different (please see the coefficients for Woman Decision-Maker x Woman 
attended VSLA). Similarly, joint decision-making does not differ between couples in which 
women attended and couples in which women did not attend. However, man decisions are 
different between the two groups. Men in couples in which women attended a VSLA invest in 
similar amounts of total cups but have different investment allocations. Men in couples of 
woman attendees invest in 0.24 fewer risky cups and 0.27 more safe cups – a near-perfect 
trade-off. These portfolio mixes are more in line with woman preferences. This suggests that 
woman attendance to VSLAs facilitates women influencing their partner’s preferences – a 
sign of empowerment.  
 
Table 12: Decision-Making Outcomes by Women's VSLA Attendance 












        
Woman -0.137 0.0892 -0.338*** -0.486* -244.7 -0.0524 -2.683 
 (0.0905) (0.133) (0.125) (0.270) (170.6) (0.0531) (264.3) 
        
Joint -0.0302 0.264** -0.312*** -0.180 -124.6 -0.0411 -70.94 
 (0.0825) (0.121) (0.115) (0.231) (159.7) (0.0497) (247.3) 
        
Woman attended 
VSLA 
0.00562 0.272** -0.241** 0.0748 -65.58 -0.0313 141.0 
 (0.0763) (0.114) (0.104) (0.206) (148.7) (0.0463) (230.4) 
        
Woman # Woman 
attended VSLA 
0.0638 -0.0677 0.138 0.212 114.5 0.0134 -307.3 
 (0.108) (0.154) (0.155) (0.316) (204.9) (0.0638) (317.4) 
        
Joint # Woman 
attended VSLA 
0.0215 -0.134 0.107 0.0123 65.41 -0.00121 -62.70 
 (0.0976) (0.139) (0.140) (0.271) (189.3) (0.0590) (293.2) 
Order Controls No No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No 
N 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 13 displays the results for random assignment to man, woman, or joint decision-making 
by men’s VSLA attendance. Compared to man decision-makers who did not attend VSLAs, 
those that did attend the VSLAs make investment decisions that result in fewer unsorted cups, 
despite having similar investment levels. This suggests that the intrinsic motivation of 
attending a VSLA plays a role in the number of cups left unsorted. For women, decision-
making is not significantly different in any outcomes between couples in which men attended 
and couples in which men did not attend. When making joint decisions, couples in which men 
attended a VSLA invest in 0.27 more risky cups than couples in which men do not attend. 
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This offsets the negotiating pattern seen earlier – men who attend a VSLA win the negotiation 
on both investment and portfolio mix levels. Perhaps this is due to increased bargaining 
power from men because they are involved in more investment-related activities.  
 
Table 13: Decision-Making Outcomes by Men's VSLA Attendance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 








        
Woman -0.135** -0.0422 -0.243** -0.498*** -213.3 -0.0247 -277.3 
 (0.0678) (0.0921) (0.100) (0.188) (129.7) (0.0404) (201.3) 
        
Joint -0.0550 0.152** -0.337*** -0.356** -147.1 -0.0478 -259.7 
 (0.0578) (0.0776) (0.0879) (0.153) (113.4) (0.0353) (176.0) 
        
Man attended 
VSLA 
-0.0679 -0.0940 -0.0409 -0.367** -90.24 0.0102 -166.4 
 (0.0686) (0.0962) (0.0979) (0.187) (133.4) (0.0415) (207.1) 
        
Woman # Man 
attended VSLA 
0.0859 0.144 0.0148 0.369 103.4 -0.0355 135.8 
 (0.0993) (0.135) (0.147) (0.285) (188.9) (0.0588) (293.2) 
        
Joint # Man 
attended VSLA 
0.102 -0.00469 0.271** 0.445* 183.3 0.0266 369.9 
 (0.0896) (0.122) (0.133) (0.249) (174.5) (0.0543) (270.8) 
Order Controls No No No No No No No 
Survey 
Controls 
No No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No 
N 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1l * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
In terms of different decision-making by the assigned laborer, woman VSLA attendance does 
not play a major role. The coefficient for Woman Laborer x Woman Attended VSLA suggests 
that women who attended a VSLA have similar outcomes to those who did not attend when 
women are assigned the laborer role. Similarly, the coefficient for Joint Laborer x Woman 
Attended VSLA shows that the number of total cups and grey cups is lower compared to man 
laborers in couples in which women did not attend a VSLA, but compared to couples who did 
not attend a VSLA and were assigned to the joint laborer role, there is no difference in 
investment decisions (see the coefficients for Joint Laborer). Only couples with woman 
VSLA attendees leave fewer unsorted cups when assigned to the joint laborer group than 
those who did not attend a VSLA and were assigned to this group. As with unsorted cups for 
gender training attendees, these results could simply indicate that VSLA attendees have more 
intrinsic motivation than non-VSLA attendees.    
 
Table 14: Labor Outcomes by Women's VSLA Attendance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
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Woman 0.0935 0.140 0.0504 -0.439* 113.7 -0.00293 663.0*** 
 (0.0738) (0.106) (0.103) (0.232) (138.3) (0.0431) (211.7) 
        
Joint 0.230** 0.564*** -0.209 0.258 212.2 -0.0294 167.9 
 (0.0987) (0.128) (0.161) (0.263) (196.7) (0.0613) (301.2) 
        
Woman 
attended VSLA 
0.0797 0.342*** -0.233** 0.380** 28.71 -0.0413 145.0 
 (0.0625) (0.0875) (0.0909) (0.161) (115.7) (0.0361) (177.2) 




-0.0314 -0.152 0.119 -0.245 -3.733 0.0321 -353.1 
 (0.0880) (0.123) (0.127) (0.269) (166.4) (0.0519) (254.8) 
        
Joint # Woman 
attended VSLA 
-0.224* -0.544*** 0.192 -0.854*** -209.8 0.00868 68.85 
 (0.120) (0.155) (0.195) (0.331) (235.8) (0.0735) (361.1) 
Order Controls No No No No No No No 
Survey 
Controls 
No No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No 
N 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
When men attend VSLA’s, the labor outcomes shift slightly. Compared to men who did not 
attend, those who attended VSLAs leave nearly 0.26 fewer cups left unsorted, once again 
reflecting the motivation of attendees and non-attendees. For woman laborers,  there is no 
statistically significant difference in any outcome between couples in which men attended 
VSLA training and those who did not. However, for joint labor decision-makers (the natural 
case), VSLA attendance plays a role. Couples in which men attended invest in 0.38 more total 
cups than those who did not attend when assigned the joint-laborer role. This difference is 
driven by an increase in risky cups' investment and results in 0.75 more unsorted cups. 
Nevertheless, payments are 756 Tsh higher for couples assigned to the natural case when men 
attend VSLAs compared to those assigned the natural case when men do not attend. While 
man attendance to VSLAs may increase investment levels and returns, it does not increase 
women's bargaining power. Because woman spouses tend to make decisions that help 
improve household welfare overall more often than men, these higher investment levels in the 
real world may not translate to higher household welfare.   
 
Table 15: Labor Outcomes by Men's VSLA Attendance 












        
Woman 0.0748 0.104 0.0376 -0.693*** 95.24 -0.00464 504.8*** 
 (0.0527) (0.0705) (0.0792) (0.153) (101.1) (0.0315) (155.9) 
        
Joint -0.0654 0.235*** -0.622*** -0.629*** -184.9 -0.102** -19.54 
 (0.0740) (0.0897) (0.137) (0.215) (136.1) (0.0425) (209.9) 
        
Man attended 
VSLA 
-0.0623 0.0177 -0.170* -0.258* -105.4 -0.0418 3.507 
 (0.0593) (0.0781) (0.0912) (0.147) (109.7) (0.0342) (169.1) 
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Woman # Man 
attended VSLA 
0.00259 -0.149 0.197 0.222 43.53 0.0525 -196.7 
 (0.0815) (0.109) (0.123) (0.240) (153.6) (0.0479) (236.8) 
        
Joint # Man 
attended VSLA 
0.382*** -0.114 1.171*** 0.753** 723.9*** 0.219*** 756.0** 
 (0.113) (0.149) (0.185) (0.319) (222.1) (0.0693) (342.3) 
Order Controls No No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No No 
N 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
6. Conclusions 
The gender gap in agriculture reflects pervasive bias, discrimination and denial of rights seen 
in other sectors of societies and economies. It also impedes development goals, and 
differences in adopting new technologies and crops by gender perpetuate the gap. Yet, little 
research has been done on spouses’ behaviors when making investment decisions solely or 
jointly when labor costs are present. Understanding their behavior can help governments and 
international organizations bridge the gender gap in technology and new crop adoption more 
effectively. We analyze the behavior of small-scale farming couples making small investment 
decisions in a lab-in-the-field experiment with a real-effort task in rural Tanzania. 
 
We find that man spouses are more likely to make larger investments with riskier returns. On 
the other hand, women are more efficient in their investments by investing at lower levels and 
minimizing ’failed investments’. When households jointly decide on the investment, they 
choose investments at quantities men would decide alone and select investment compositions 
in line with women’s preferences. Our detailed analysis shows that this happens because 
when couples decide jointly, they consider that the couple assigned to the task might not 
perform well in the task (mostly men in our experimental context) they adjust their 
investments accordingly. Therefore joint decision making produces better investment 
outcomes. We also show that investment preferences and investment outcomes vary 
depending on which spouse is assigned to work on this labor-intensive task. When husbands 
are supposed to work, wives invest less because their husbands make less effort and do not 
complete the full task.  This causes low performance in labor-intensive tasks (e.g., real effort 
experiment) among men and leads to investment failures and loss of money. 
 
Our heterogeneity analysis shows that woman spouses who attended gender training in the 
past twelve months chose riskier investments and invested more. Moreover, when women 
who attended gender training bargain with their husband on the investment, couples decrease 
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the total investment levels in line with women’s preferences. We found that, , men’s 
investment decision is similar to women’s in the households that women participated in 
VSLAs. On the contrary, in the households where men attended VSLAs men followed their 
risky preferences even stronger than men did not attend. This shows that there is a 
relationship between the bargaining power of spouses and participating in VSLAs.    
 
We have two main policy conclusions on scaling small-scale farmer adoption of new labour-
intensive agricultural practices requiring small financial investments (e.g., intercropping, 
manuring and composting). First, our results show that joint decisions on investment can lead 
to higher and safer investments, and promoting such decision-making could lead to higher 
and more stable incomes. Second, when invested in the tasks (or plots) that woman farmers 
are responsible for in the household, those joint investments lead to efficient outcomes thanks 
to hardworking women. This implies that development practitioners can support women’s 
self-empowerment through improved bargaining power and promote joint decision-making on 
investment decisions within the family. Improved bargaining power will close the gender gap 
in the implementation of agricultural practices among married women in rural areas. Our 
tentative results on gender training show that especially gender training and, to some extent, 
VSLAs might be instruments to women empowerment and the bargaining power in joint 
decision-making. 
 
Our paper also raises questions for new future research. First, it would be interesting to 
rigorously test the influence of gender training and VSLA’s on women’s bargaining power in 
agricultural investment and explore the mechanism. Future research should also investigate 
the barriers, drivers and incentives for joint decision making in the household investment 
decision that is more efficient than a decision than a man spouse make alone. Finally, our 
results also show that men in the household do not perform well with this labor-intensive bean 
sorting task. Therefore future research needed on how to change men’s overvaluation of their 
own labour and undervaluation of women’s labor, and how to improve joint decision-making 
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Appendix A: Checks for balance  
Table A.A1: Balance along covariates across treatment groups 
 





Male age 41.62 44.49 43.63 45.34 44.52 44.19 46.13 0.05 
Female age 36.78 39.23 37.96 40.89 38.60 39.55 40.84 0.10 
Household size 4.92 5.07 5.34 5.41 5.23 4.97 4.99 0.00 
Man's number of 
spouses 
1.04 1.11 1.07 1.11 1.04 1.03 1.04 0.10 
Farm area 2.51 2.86 2.96 3.43 2.95 3.32 2.96 0.24 
Wage income 0.68 0.64 0.52 0.54 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.05 
Any spouse 
attended FFS 




0.88 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.87 0.00 
Any spouse 
attended VSLA 
0.77 0.85 0.79 0.78 0.71 0.79 0.80 0.05 
Join decision-
making index 
2.18 1.88 2.04 2.09 2.32 2.19 2.22 0.10 
Labor index 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.00 
Income control 
index 
0.44 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.00 
Distraction 
treatment 
0.44 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.49 0.42 0.00 
Experiment 
order 
9.22 10.87 9.41 10.18 9.88 10.44 13.34 0.29 
















Table A.A2: Balance across covariates by assignment of optimal or sub-optimal laborer  
    
 Optimal Laborer Sub-Optimal Laborer Difference 
Male age 43.82 44.33 0.517  
[0.68] [1.01] [1.231]  
Female Age 38.86 38.81 -0.057  
[0.64] [0.91] [1.142]  
Household Size 5.15 5.18 0.033  
[0.11] [0.16] [0.197]  
Man's number of spouses 1.06 1.08 0.023  
[0.01] [0.02] [0.025]  
Farm area 3.03 2.96 -0.062  
[0.10] [0.11] [0.168]  
Wage income (y/n) 0.59 0.64 0.043  
[0.03] [0.04] [0.050]  
Any spouse attended FFS 0.83 0.84 0.012  
[0.02] [0.03] [0.038]  
Any spouse attended gender training  0.9 0.9 -0.004  
[0.02] [0.03] [0.031]  
Any spouse attended VSLA 0.76 0.83 0.065  
[0.02] [0.03] [0.042]  
Joint decision-making index 2.06 2.24     0.173*   
[0.06] [0.07] [0.099]  
Labor index 0.91 0.95     0.040***   
[0.01] [0.01] [0.014]  
Income control index 0.47 0.52     0.054*   
[0.02] [0.03] [0.032]  
Distraction treatment 0.5 0.41    -0.093*   
[0.03] [0.04] [0.051]  
Experiment order 10.27 9.4 -0.871  
[0.37] [0.57] [0.669]  
N  310 135 445 
Significance levels:    * < 10%    ** < 5%    *** < 1% 
Standard errors in brackets 
 
Appendix B: Robustness Checks 
Table A.B1: Conditional Differences in Means by Decision-Maker: Male Base  
















        
Female Decision-
Maker (= 1) -0.101* 0.0429 -0.266** -0.387* -175.9* -0.0467 -232.0 
 (0.0607) (0.114) (0.131) (0.229) (90.89) (0.0289) (152.0) 
        
Joint Decision-
Maker (= 1) -0.0133 0.160 -0.222** -0.162 -66.23 -0.0365 -142.7 
 (0.0545) (0.103) (0.111) (0.194) (82.85) (0.0259) (145.2) 
        
Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
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Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. 
Male decision-makers are the base category.      
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
="* p<0.10 
 ** 
p<0.05  *** p<0.01"     
Table A.B2: Conditional Differences in Means by Decision-Maker: Female Base 













Std. Dev. Payment 
        
        
Male Decision-
Maker (= 1) 0.101* -0.0429 0.266** 0.387* 175.9* 0.0467 232.0 
 (0.0607) (0.114) (0.131) (0.229) (90.89) (0.0289) (152.0) 
        
Joint Decision-
Maker (= 1) 0.0880* 0.117 0.0439 0.225 109.6 0.0102 89.32 
 (0.0518) 
(0.0985
) (0.123) (0.219) (74.40) (0.0249) (124.2) 
        
Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
        
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. 
Female decision-makers are the base category.      
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
="* p<0.10 
 ** 
p<0.05  *** p<0.01"     
 
 
Table A.B3: Conditional Differences in Means by Laborer: Male Base  














        
        
Female Laborer 
(= 1) 0.0813* 0.0223 0.153 -0.569*** 132.6* 0.0271 412.6*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0932) (0.109) (0.183) (71.39) (0.0236) (120.2) 
        
Joint Choice of 
Laborer (= 1) 0.105* 0.153 0.0157 -0.226 136.8 0.00326 279.0** 
 (0.0590) (0.117) (0.148) (0.243) (84.32) (0.0305) (141.2) 
        
Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
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Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. 
Male laborers are the base category.     
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
="* p<0.10 
 ** 









Table A.B 4: Conditional Differences in Means by Laborer: Female Base 














        
        
Male Laborer      
(= 1) -0.0813* -0.0223 -0.153 0.569*** -132.6* -0.0271 -412.6*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0932) (0.109) (0.183) (71.39) (0.0236) (120.2) 
        
Joint Choice of 
Laborer (= 1) 0.0241 0.131 -0.137 0.343 4.283 -0.0239 -133.6 
 (0.0570) (0.108) (0.143) (0.247) (85.47) (0.0304) (148.4) 
        
Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
        
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses     
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
="* p<0.10 
 ** 




Table A.B5: Conditional Differences in Means by Sub-Optimal Labor Allocation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Total 








Std. Dev. Payment 
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Sub-Optimal Laborer 
(= 1) -0.108** -0.0735 -0.122** 0.273** -134.7* -0.0134 -326.3** 
 (0.0463) (0.0704) (0.0615) (0.122) (81.53) (0.0264) (134.8) 
        
Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 
        
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses 
Base is the optimal laborer being assigned to sort     
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
="* p<0.10 
 ** 
p<0.05  *** p<0.01"     
 
Table A.B6: Conditional Differences in Means by Sub-Optimal Labor Allocation and Decision-Maker 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Total 








Std. Dev. Payment 
        
        
Sub-Optimal Laborer (= 1) -0.0238 -0.0600 0.0455 0.551*** -47.56 -0.0223 -459.5** 
 (0.0765) (0.113) (0.105) (0.188) (140.7) (0.0456) (232.4) 
        
Female Decision-Maker -0.0879 -0.230*** 0.0532 -0.206 -152.3 -0.0511 -369.4** 
 (0.0600) (0.0889) (0.0823) (0.189) (107.2) (0.0347) (177.0) 
        
Joint Decision-Maker 0.0298 -0.246*** 0.281*** 0.0201 -29.46 -0.0397 -143.1 
 (0.0589) (0.0878) (0.0809) (0.179) (108.9) (0.0353) (179.8) 
        
Sub-Optimal Laborer (= 1) 
# Female Decision-Maker -0.0531 -0.121 -0.0356 -0.447 -78.08 0.0152 471.1 
 (0.110) (0.168) (0.148) (0.295) (196.6) (0.0637) (324.6) 
        
Sub-Optimal Laborer (= 1) 
# Joint Decision-Maker -0.203* 0.0914 -0.452*** -0.472* -176.3 0.0131 -50.32 
 (0.111) (0.165) (0.150) (0.283) (196.7) (0.0637) (324.8) 
        
Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 
        
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses     
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
="* p<0.10 
 ** 












Table A.B 7: Conditional Differences in Means by Sub-Optimal Labor Allocation and Laborer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Total 








Std. Dev. Payment 
        
        
Sub-Optimal Laborer (= 1) -0.124** 0.0285 -0.232*** -0.147 -115.8 -0.00303 -201.4 
 (0.0625) (0.0952) (0.0830) (0.161) (109.9) (0.0356) (180.1) 
        
Female Laborer (= 1) 0.00175 0.152* -0.120 -0.684*** 52.49 0.0200 281.0* 
 (0.0551) (0.0831) (0.0739) (0.162) (99.10) (0.0321) (162.4) 
        
Sub-Optimal Laborer (= 1) # 
Female Laborer (= 1) 0.223 -0.0618 0.451** -0.694 202.0 0.0336 759.7* 
 (0.154) (0.225) (0.211) (0.624) (280.2) (0.0906) (459.1) 
        
Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 
        
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses     
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
="* p<0.10 
 ** 





Appendix C: The Labor Cost Treatment 
Half of the sessions included music and snacks in the bean-sorting area. The intention was 
that these would provide a distraction or an incentive to not work and therefore, adjust the 
labor costs of the participants. However, the intervention did not have the intended effect and 
was too weak to effect any changes. We encourage further research along these lines in real-
effort tasks to find ways to exogenously affect labor costs. This is particularly important in 
gender studies because women tend to have higher marginal labor costs because they have 
more household duties than men. Table A.C1 to A.C3 show that the labor cost treatment had 
no overall effects, no heterogeneous effects by decision-maker, and no heterogeneous effects 




Table A.C1: Effect of Labor Cost Treatment on Experiment Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






       
Labor Cost 
Treatment 
0.0597 -0.0648 0.153 -0.168 -0.00754 103.4 
 (0.0948) (0.158) (0.124) (0.206) (0.0303) (152.0) 
Order Controls No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 




Table A.C2: Effect of Labor Cost Treatment on Experiment Outcomes by Decision-Makers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








      
 0.0436 -0.237 0.309 -0.202 -0.0473 173.2 
 (0.109) (0.210) (0.211) (0.346) (0.0502) (243.8) 
       
Woman -0.108 -0.355** 0.132 -0.287 -0.0748* -161.8 
 (0.0888) (0.179) (0.153) (0.245) (0.0403) (237.4) 
       
Joint -0.0231 -0.342** 0.269 -0.244 -0.0613 -72.38 
 (0.0896) (0.174) (0.198) (0.297) (0.0452) (202.5) 





0.0259 0.272 -0.214 -0.127 0.0715 -116.5 
 (0.130) (0.241) (0.233) (0.496) (0.0530) (285.0) 




0.0233 0.251 -0.208 0.156 0.0457 -80.28 
 (0.134) (0.242) (0.248) (0.449) (0.0574) (253.6) 
Order Controls No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 





Table A.C3: Effect of Labor Cost Treatment on Experiment Outcomes by Laborers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






       
Labor Cost 
Treatment 
0.0101 -0.101 0.0936 -0.201 -0.00651 113.8 
 (0.0976) (0.227) (0.172) (0.239) (0.0343) (192.1) 
       
Woman 0.0363 0.103 -0.0222 -0.618** 0.0177 416.4** 
 (0.0702) (0.176) (0.119) (0.273) (0.0330) (203.4) 
       
Joint 0.0440 -0.116 0.160 -0.452 -0.0148 314.3 
 (0.0791) (0.199) (0.176) (0.278) (0.0445) (258.4) 




0.0758 0.0415 0.112 0.0408 0.000756 -6.285 
 (0.0951) (0.266) (0.190) (0.428) (0.0480) (252.6) 




0.0964 0.0703 0.0903 0.278 -0.0195 -142.5 
 (0.120) (0.342) (0.242) (0.522) (0.0680) (297.3) 
Order Controls No No No No No No 
Survey Controls No No No No No No 
Session Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No No No 
N 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.  (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors clustered at session-treatment group level 
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